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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the Interest of: 
MICHAEL GENE TANNER, JR., 
(8/18/59) 
A Minor, 
Case No. 14174 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the Utah Department of Social 
Services, Division of Family Services, from the order 
requiring said Division to provide orthodonture services 
to the above-named juvenile. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was ordered to provide such orthodonture 
services to Michael Gene Tanner, Jr., as are required to 
correct his dental condition, by the Second District 
Juvenile Court, in and for salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Regnal W. Garff, Jr., presiding. 
On February 7, 1975, the matter was brought before the 
Court on an affidavit for order to show cause and on June 2, 
1975, the court entered its judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks that the judgment of the Juvenile Court 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent agrees with Appellantfs Statement of the Facts 
with the exception of the first sentence of the first full 
paragraph on page 3 of Appellant's Brief, which states: "Respon-
dent, presently, has dental difficulties that may require 
orthodonture work for their correction.1' (emphasis added) The 
Juvenile Court!s Finding of Fact No. 4 stated, "Michael Gene 
Tanner, Jr., has dental difficulties that will require 




BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW REQUIRE APPELLANT TO PROVIDE 
THE REQUESTED SERVICES UNDER THE STATE'S FOSTER CARE 
PROGRAM FOR DEPENDENT CHILDREN. 
Respondent has been adjudicated a neglected and dependent 
child within the provisions of Section 55-10-77, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, and therefore care, custody, and control of 
the child was placed in the Utah State Division of Family 
Services (hereafter the Agency) by the Juvenile Court. The 
Juvenile Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceed-
ings concerning a child determined to be within the provisions 
of Section 55-10-77, Utah Code Annodated 1953. When the Agency 
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is the custodian and guardian of a child, pursuant to Section 
55-10-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, it so acts pursuant to the 
authority granted to it under the provisions of Section 55-15b-l, 
et seq., Utah Code Annotated 1953. Funding for the Foster Care 
Program, as this program is known, comes partly from the State 
of Utah and partly from the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §606 (d) and 
45 C.F.R. §220.19. 
State law requires that the Agency comply with the Social 
Security Act and with regulations adopted pursuant thereto. Sec-
tion 55-15b-ll, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in pertinent 
part: 
The Division shall comply with and conform to all require-
ments of the Federal Social Security Act, as amended, and 
to all orders, rules, and regulations promulgated, made or 
adopted pursuant thereto, when required as a condition to 
participation in any benefits under the Social Security Act. 
In addition, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
mandates conformity to federal law and regulations. 
The Juvenile Court concluded that the Agency operates a program 
of foster care services and that the Agency has a duty to meet 
the medical and other established needs of its wards under this 
program pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §606(d), 
and the pertinent regulations, 45 C.F.R. §220. Appellant seemingly 
concedes this point in his Brief in that he fails to contest or 
deal with these findings in any way, except to raise the alter-
native statute and regulations governing the Medicaid Program. 
(See Point II of Respondents Brief). Even if Appellant does 
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not concede these points, these conclusions of law are correct 
because said provisions require that the Statefs Foster Care 
Program assure that a child in foster care receives proper 
care. In addition, said federal regulations specifically re-
quire that the child's needs for preventive and remedial . 
medical services must be identified and that the child must 
be assisted in obtaining said services. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that the child has dental 
difficulties that require orthodonture work for their cor-
rection. Dr. Candland Olsen's diagnosis was as follows: 
His malocclusion is characterized by severe protrusion 
of his upper incisors nearly straight into his upper lips. 
They are out of function in this position. Subsequently, 
the lower incisors bear into the tissue of the roof of the 
mouth. 
This is a severe malocclusion and the terminal results will 
be early loss of the upper incisors due to destruction of 
the supportive tissue and bones. This would result in a 
dental handicap that would be very, very difficult to repair 
or to subside the continued early loss of adjacent teeth. 
(R. 54) 
Dr. Orson Wright did not controvert that medical need. (R. 
26, 34). Furthermore, the additional evidence of the social 
and emotional needs of the child stemming from this dental 
problem is also uncontroverted. (R. 16, 17, and 18). 
Thus the record shows uncontroverted evidence of a medical 
need as well as social and emotional needs. The Juvenile Court 
found that it is the' Agency's duty to provide treatment for 
these needs in its Foster Care Program, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§606(d) and 45 C.F.R. §220. Appellant has not met or demon-
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strated any fault in this conclusion. The Agency is admittedly 
providing no treatment for the child's established need. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM. AND THE FOSTER CARE PROGRAM ARE 
SEPARATE PROGRAMS AND APPELLANT'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE 
THE REQUESTED SERVICES UNDER THE REGULATIONS OF THE 
MEDICAID PROGRAM DOES NOT AFFECT APPELLANT'S DUTY TO 
PROVIDE SAID SERVICES UNDER THE FOSTER CARE PROGRAM. 
The Foster Care Program is set up under Title IV-A of 
the Social Security Act, Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, 42 U.S.C. §601, et seq. The Medicaid Program is set 
up under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Grants to States 
for Medical Assistance Programs, 42 U.S.C. §1396, et seq. 
Respondent is not claiming eligibility for said services under 
the Medicaid Program, Title XIX; he is claiming said services under 
Title IV-A, the Dependent Children's Foster Care Program. The 
various attempts of Appellant in its Brief at pages 5, 8, and 
10 to raise as a defense: (1) The regulations governing the 
Medicaid Program, 45 C.F.R. §§205.146 and 250.18; (2) the State 
statute relating to the Medicaid Program, Section 55-15a-3, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; and the case of Pazdera v. Department of 
Health and Social Services, PLR §18,871, are all irrelevant 
because the Title XIX Medicaid Program is not at issue here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
THE OUTLINE OF THE PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA USED IN RELA-
TION TO THE SALZMAN INDEX WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM 
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EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE SALZMAN INDEX IS THE ELIGIBILITY 
STANDARD FOR THE MEDICAID PROGRAM ONLY, NOT THE FOSTER 
CARE PROGRAM. 
It is true that the Agency is required to offer certain 
dental services under the Medicaid Program and to promulgate 
regulations governing the administration of said program. This 
fact would be relevant only if the child!s claim for orthodonture 
treatment was made pursuant to that program; however, it is not. 
If the State could provide said services to the child under the 
Medicaid Program, that would meet the childfs need. Neverthe-
less, the Medicaid Program is established to serve a much 
broader class of person than the sub-class of children in 
foster care to which Respondent belongs. There is ho incon-
sistency in the child failing to qualify under the standards 
of the Medicaid Program, but being eligible to receive said 
services under the Foster Care Program. The purposes, standards, 
regulations, and funding are different for these distinct 
programs. 
Appellant's attempt to suggest that the Agency may become 
subject to charges that it has denied equal protection to 
other applicants for orthodontic work if the lower court's 
Order is affirmed in favor of Respondent (Appellant's Brief, 
14) is a specious argument because the child would not be 
participating in the Medicaid Program at all. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT IV 
EVEN IF THE OUTLINE OF THE PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA 
USED IN RELATION TO THE SALZMAN INDEX WAS IMPROPERLY 
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EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE, IT WOULD NOT HAVE HAD A SUBSTAN-
TIAL INFLUENCE IN BRINGING ABOUT A DIFFERENT FINDING. 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence only allow the lower 
court's decision to be set aside by reason of the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence if it "would probably have had a substan-
tial influence in bringing about a different verdict or finding." 
Since Appellant's witness, Dr. Orson Wright, testified fully 
about the contents of the excluded document, the procedures 
and criteria used in relation to the Salzman Index, and the 
specific assessment made of the Respondent, any error was 
harmless. In addition, it should be noted that Dr. Wright 
did not disagree with Dr. Olsen's evaluation of the child's 
dental difficulties. He simply added his conclusion that on 




APPELLANT HAS A FIDUCIARY DUTY BY STATUTE AS THE CHILD'S 
GUARDIAN TO PROVIDE FOR HIS ESTABLISHED NEEDS, AND THIS 
DUTY IS SEPARATE AND IN ADDITION TO WHATEVER DUTIES APPELL-
ANT HAS UNDER THE FOSTER CARE PROGRAM AND THE MEDICAID 
PROGRAM. 
It is not clear whether (1) Appellant contends that 
it has no fiduciary duty as the child's guardian to meet 
its ward's established medical, social, and emotional needs 
or (2) if Appellant accepts the fiduciary duty and simply 
contends that it is not obligated to provide the particular 
treatment that the Juvenile Court found necessary here. 
It would be an absurdity for Appellant to contend that it 
has no fiduciary duty to meet the established medical, social 
and emotional needs of its ward. The statutory definitions 
found in Section 55-10-64, Utah Code Annotated 1953, clearly 
impose duties, including the duty to protect, train, and 
discipline the child and the duty to provide him with food, 
clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care. There-
fore, the issue is whether Appellant's duty to its ward obligates 
it to provide the treatment in question. 
The Juvenile Court found, as Appellant points out in 
its Brief at page 6, that Appellant has both the authority 
and obligation to provide the treatment in question. By 
isolating one portion of Conclusion of Law No. 5 together with 
only one portion of the statute, Appellant attempts to make 
it appear that the authority and obligation to consent to 
the treatment were made synonomous from the beginning. This 
is not so. The court examined the definitions of "guardianship", 
Section 55-10-64(9), Utah Code Annotated 1953, and of "legal 
authority," Section 55-10-64(7), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
in relation to the evidence in the record and concluded that 
the statute obliged Appellant to provide the treatment sought 
in this case. The court was not deciding all cases, just 
the instant case, and the Honorable Judge was clearly called 
upon to decide what obligation Appellant had. 
Appellant further contends (Appellantfs Brief, 5) that 
even if an obligation is found, "that is not identical with 
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an obligation to pay/1 citing as authority 59 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Parent & Child, §15, Medical Care, at 98. This seems to 
amount to a contention that Appellant's obligation is a nullity 
and the Agency is a power unto itself, whose actions are un-
reviewable. The authority cited does not support such a 
contention because it simply states the obvious, that it 
is ordinarily for the parent or guardian in the first instance 
to decide what treatment is necessary. The sentence before 
the one cited states, 
A parent [guardian] has a legally enforceable duty 
to provide his child with necessary medical care. 
(59 Am. Jr. 2d, Parent & Child, §15, Medical Care, at 98) 
Another section makes it abundantly clear that a parent or 
guardian has a legal obligation to do whatever may be necessary 
for the care of his ward: 
It is the right and duty of parents [guardians] under 
the...common law and the statutes of many states to 
protect their children, to care for them in sickness 
and in health, and to do whatever may be necessary for 
their care, maintenance, and preservation. The child has 
the right to call upon the parent [guardian] for the 
discharge of this duty. 
(59 Am. Jur. 2d, Parent and Child, §14, Protection and Care, 
at 96) 
Court-ordered orthodonture treatment is clearly proper when 
the parent or guardian fails to provide it. Rickman v. Rickman, 
96 S.2d 6 74, 266 Ala.. 3 71 (19 57) . 
In sum, Appellantfs duty to care for its wards and meet 
their established needs is clear under the statute and other 
authority cited by Appellant itself. In addition, the evidence 
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establishing the child's needs medically, emotionally, and 
socially in this case was uncontroverted. Therefore Appellant 
is obligated by State statute to provide the treatment sought, 
as ordered by the Juvenile Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT VI 
APPELLANT HAS A COMMON LAW FIDUCIARY DUTY AS THE CHILD'S 
GUARDIAN TO PROVIDE FOR HIS NEEDS. 
At no point in the Juvenile Court proceeding or in Appellant's 
Brief does Appellant dispute the contention that the Agency 
has a common law fiduciary duty to care for its ward. The 
authorities cited in this Brief under Point V (at 9), leave 
no question that such fiduciary duty exists under common 
law, in addition to the duties codified by statutes. The 
Juvenile Court was correct in concluding that Appellant had 
a common law duty, in addition to the duty found under State 
statutes and under Federal statutes and regulations, to provide 
its ward with the treatment required. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT VII 
THE AGENCY HAS AN ESTABLISHED AND APPROVED FOSTER 
CARE PROGRAM AND THE AGENCY'S ADMINISTRATION OF THAT 
PROGRAM IN RELATION TO RESPONDENT IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW. 
Appellant contends that the Juvenile Court has no authority 
to order it to provide the services in question. (Appellant's 
Brief, 6-8) Juvenile Court has jurisdiction of this matter 
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pursuant to Section 55-10-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
In a matter properly within its jurisdiction, a court is 
often required to decide questions involving the expenditure 
of State funds. Since the various State agencies are subject 
to the law, the only issue left is whether the court interpreted 
the law correctly. 
Appellant seems to contend that the Juvenile Court was 
expending funds of the Agency for a program not approved 
by the Agency in violation of the 1975 Appropriation Act. 
(Appellant!s Brief, 7, 8) This contention is simply met 
by pointing out the admitted fact that the Agency has approved 
and currently operates a Foster Care Program pursuant to State 
and Federal law. The issue is whether the Juvenile Court!s 
Judgment that the applicable law requires the expenditure 
for orthodonture treatment in this case is correct, and this 
issue is dealt with in Point I of this Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT VIII. 
A REQUIREMENT TO EXHAUST ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED BY THIS COURT BECAUSE: 
(1) IT WAS APPELLANT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO REQUEST AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IF APPELLANT FELT ONE WAS 
REQUIRED AND (2) APPELLANT HAS FULLY CONSIDERED AND 
DECIDED THE ISSUES AT THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LEVEL. 
Appellant contends that this matter should be remanded 
to the Agency for exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
This is a paradoxical claim because it is the Agency that 
is the child's guardian and, as his guardian, the Agency should 
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have requested any hearing required. Therefore, the Agency 
did not meet its fiduciary responsibilities as the child's guardian 
in this respect. The Agency should not be allowed to raise 
its own failure as a defense at this stage. 
In addition, it is clear that the Agency has exhaustively 
considered the issues raised here and carefully decided them 
in a long series of negotiations and discussions, which is 
reflected in the hearing transcript (R. 7) and Findings (R. 
48) No useful purpose could be served by asking the Agency 
to reconsider what it has already fully considered. Walker 
Bank v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 234, 390 P. 2d 592 (1964), and IML 
Freight, Inc. v. Ottesen, JJtah 2d ' , 538 P.2d 
296 (1975) . 
CONCLUSION 
Michael Gene Tanner, Jr., has demonstrated a medical, social 
and emotional need for orthodonture treatment. The Agency 
contends that he is not eligible for said treatment under the 
provisions of the Medicaid Program. The child is not claiming 
nor did the Juvenile Court order treatment under Medicaid. 
The relevant statutes and regulations are those of the Foster 
Care Program, under which the child clearly qualifies. In 
addition, the Agency has a common law and statutory fiduciary 
duty to provide its ward with necessary care and treatment. 
The Agencyfs decision to deny said treatment, reached after 
thorough consideration by the Agency, is subject to judicial 
review. 
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Therefore, this Court should affirm the Judgment of the 
Juvenile Court. 
Respectfully Submitted, * 
f/Vt^J^^/i ^ V ^ V ^ — V . 
MICHAEL SHEPARD ' 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
